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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOSEPH HOSKINS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050506 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Robbery, a second-
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 and one count of assault, a 
class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN FAILING TO 
ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF AQUITTAL AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE FOR THE REASONS 
THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
A CONVICTION? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was properly preserved for appeal by 
the defense motion to dismiss at the end of the State's case. The appellate court must 
determine as a matter of law and fact whether the evidence at trial supported the 
Defendant's conviction. "When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a 
criminal jury trial, we begin with the threshold issue of statutory interpretation, which 
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we decide as a matter of law. With regard to the facts, 'we review the evidence and 
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict of the jury.'" State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 355(Utah Ct. App. 
1995)(quoting State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1992)(citations omitted). 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
RULING TO ADMIT EXPERT TESTIMONY OF OFICER 
TOLMAN REGARDING A FLASH TEST OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S URINE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was preserved for appeal when an 
objection was made was made, argued, and ruled on by the trial court (R.133 / 320). 
A trial court's decision to either grant or deny a continuance is clearly within its 
discretion. Therefore, we will not disturb such decisions absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Tolano, 19 P.3d 400, 414 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted) 
See also State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
POINT III 
DID THE PROSECUTOR COMMIT MISCONDUCT BY 
TELLING THE JURY THAT THEY NEED NOT WORRY 
ABOUT REASONABLE DOUBT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In determining whether a given statement 
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of the 
totality of the evidence presented at trial. See State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 927 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Because the issue was not raised with the trial court it should 
be analyzed under a plain error standard of review. "[T]o establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly 
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objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant. . ." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
POINT IV 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 
SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY 
HIS ATTORNEY'S BLATANT FAILURES DURING AND 
BEFORE TRIAL? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter 
of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of 
counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the 
United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was adopted in State 
v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was ineffective. 
The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Article 1, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. 
4 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or 
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal 
property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate 
force against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Section 76- 5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury 
to another. 
Section 77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice requirements. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in 
a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held 
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon 
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the 
hearing. 
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(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony 
sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to 
meet the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult 
with the opposing party on reasonable notice. 
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee 
charged by the expert for the consultation. 
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the 
results of any tests or other specialized data, the party intending to call the 
witness shall provide to the opposing party the information upon request. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the information 
concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving notice shall 
provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates 
calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the information required 
under Subsection (l)(b). 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with 
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to 
prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result 
of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose 
appropriate sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony 
will only apply if the court finds that a party deliberately violated the 
provisions of this section. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary 
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of 
the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to 
by the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing 
shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum 
vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the 
expert may be called as an expert witness. 
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of the 
state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on 
reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as a 
witness at trial, and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult 
with the opposing party upon reasonable notice. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 17 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all 
the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, 
or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged in an information dated November 9, 2004, with 
the offenses of robbery, a second-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
6-301 and assault, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102. 
On November 9, 2004, the Defendant made an initial appearance and the information 
was read. On December 20, 2004, the preliminary hearing was held; the matter was 
bound over for trial. The jury trial was held on March 8, and 9, 2005 with the 
Honorable Judge John Morris presiding. 
After a two-day jury trial, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty to both 
counts. On May 24, 2005, the Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in 
the Utah State Prison of 1-15 years in prison together with one year on the 
misdemeanor to run concurrently. The Defendant was transported to the Utah State 
Prison to commence his prison term. The Defendant filed his notice of appeal on 
May 31, 2005. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The victim, who was staying at the Ogden River Inn on a long-term basis, had 
been drinking the night of August 16th. He had consumed approximately 12 beers late 
into the night and then was awaken by a knock on the door at 5:30 a.m. (R. 132/86) 
A prostitute that he had utilized in the past1, known to him by the name of Brown 
Sugar was at his door, and he let her in to use the phone. (R. 132/88) She asked him 
if he "wanted to have fun" (meaning did he want to pay for sexual services) which he 
declined. He gave her $10 or $20 for bus fare and she left. (R. 132/137) 
Approximately 30-45 minutes later she came back to his room accompanied by two 
black males, whom the victim could not identify. (R. 132/92) As he was sitting on the 
chair, one of the individuals hit him on the side of the head and knocked him into the 
heating register. (R. 132/95) The two male individuals then pulled down his pants 
and took his wallet, which contained money and credit cards. (R. 132/95) All three 
assailants then left the room, taking both the cell phone and the motel phone. The 
victim called the police from a neighboring room. The police arrived, gathered 
minimal evidence and examined the victim. Although the victim had some cuts on 
his ear, and was bleeding, he refused to go to the hospital for medical attention. (R. 
132/68) Later, he decided to go to the hospital for an examination which resulted in 
a diagnosis of a laceration to his ear that required more than 40 stitches to close. (R. 
132/99) At trial, the victim reiterated the fact that he couldn't identify either of the 
two male assailants. (R 132/96) 
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Terranosha Jackman testified that she has always gone by the name of 
Chocolate. She never remembered using the name Brown Sugar. (R. 133/201) She 
testified that she had pled guilty to the robbery in this case and was awaiting 
sentencing. (R. 132/139) On August 17, 2004, she was addicted to crack cocaine, 
and was using cocaine on a frequent basis. (R. 132 /143) She claimed that she had 
gone to the victim's room the night before, at 7:00 p.m. and had eaten pizza with the 
victim. (R. 133/179) She returned at 3:00 a.m.2 and she claimed that the victim had 
paid her $20 to perform a sexual act. (R. 133/181) She was going to leave and come 
back to perform the act, but never upheld her end of the bargain. (R. 132/144, 146) 
When she went to the victim's room at 3:00 a.m., according to her account, she was 
accompanied by a co-defendant Ellis Ringwood. Mr. Ringwood stayed outside while 
she went into the victim's room to use the phone. (R. 132/148) Later in her 
testimony Ms. Jackman testified that she went into the victim's room to call Ellis. 
Upon questioning her on that discrepancy she simply ignored it and went on with her 
testimony. (R. 133/180) She then claimed that she went to a party by the Marshall 
White center with Ellis and told him that they could get some money from a "trick" 
(the victim). (R. 132/151) She returned to the victims room early the next morning 
accompanied by Ellis and the Defendant while she was high on crack-cocaine. She 
was so high on cocaine that her memory was hazy. (R. 132/145, 152, 188) She 
testified that the Defendant hit the victim and then he and Ellis took the money. (R. 
1
 There is a dispute as to what that act entailed, the victim claimed at first he did not ever hire her for her 
services, but later admitted to paying for oral sex. Ms. Jackman testified that he paid for and received 
intercourse. (R. 133/133, 178) 
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132/161) On cross-examination she admitted that she did not see the victim get hit. 
(R. 133/194) According to Ms. Jackman the group then left the motel and went to a 
Maverick store and divided up the money with each receiving $60. (R. 164, 224) 
Ms. Jackman admitted that she was testifying to fulfill her end of a plea 
bargain that reduced her charges from Aggravated Robbery to Robbery. (R. 133/176) 
Ms. Jackman has given several versions of this incident, including one to Det. 
Draper, one to Det. Melcher, and one at trial. (R. 133/203-208) She admitted that 
when she was on cocaine her memory would be affected, and that it was the worst 
when she had been using and awake for a long time. She admitted that she had been 
up for at least 24 hours at the time of this incident. (R. 133 /226) 
Ellis Ringwood testified that he had been up for several days getting high on 
crack cocaine on the 17th of August 2004. (R. 133/240) At some time in the morning 
(although he couldn't remember when) of August 17, 2004, Ms. Jackman called him 
on his cell phone.(R. 133/241) His testimony conflicts with that of Ms. Jackman's in 
that he testified that when she called him he was at a house on Childs street getting 
high with six other people, rather than in his car outside the Ogden River Inn. (R. 
133/242) He testified that Ms. Jackman is a liar, and that "she's known to lie about 
everything basically,"(sic) and that she "will lie to get what she wants, to gain." 
(sic)(R. 133/278, 290) He testified that she lied by saying that a John owed her some 
money, and she wanted a couple of guys to go with her to intimidate the guy. (R. 
133/247) He stated that they went to the motel room with Ms. Jackman and the 
2
 There is a conflict in Ms. Jackman's testimony on this accord, she also testified that he gave her the $20 the 
night before, at approximately 7:00 p.m. (R. 132/144) 
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Defendant and that the two guys stood off to the side while Ms. Jackman got the 
victim to open the door. They all then went into the room. (R. 133/251) When he 
saw the victim, he recognized him as someone who gets high. This was another 
contradiction to the testimony of Ms. Jackman and the victim. (R. 133/254) His 
testimony then diverges from that of the prior two in that he said that the Defendant 
hit the victim several times and pulled the chair out from under him. (R. 133/256) He 
then contradicts the testimony of Ms. Jackman in claiming that they drove straight to 
the house on Child's and did not stop at the Maverick. He disputed that they ever 
went to the Maverick store. (R. 133/260, 261) He claimed that they each got about 
$120 - $140, again in contradiction of both Ms. Jackman and the victim who testified 
to $60 each or $200 total respectively. (R. 133/261, 224, 65) Mr. Ringwood also 
admitted that he received a plea bargain in exchange for his testimony. (R. 133/266) 
He testified that he earlier had lied to the police to "make it go in my favor". (R. 
133/285) He admitted lying at the preliminary hearing (R. 133/292) 
The prosecution then rested and the Defendant moved for a directed verdict of 
acquittal. The court, without allowing any argument, denied the motion. (R. 133/292) 
Danielle Peterson, the Defendant's former girlfriend, then testified that she was with 
the Defendant on the night in question. (R. 133/295) She recalled the Defendant 
being in her home that night and helping her get their child to sleep. They went to 
bed together at about midnight; and she awoke two to three times during the night to 
care for their child, each time noticing that the Defendant was in the bed asleep. (R. 
133/296) On cross-examination the prosecutor elicited testimony about the 
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Defendant's prison stay, and then began directly asking questions about the 
Defendant being on parole. The defense objected, which objection was apparently 
overruled at a sidebar conference since the prosecutor was allowed to continue the 
questioning concerning the parole officer. (R. 133/307) 
The prosecution then called the Defendant's parole officer as a witness over 
the objection of the Defendant. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed 
the parole officer to testify. He testified that on August 17, 2004, the Defendant went 
into his office and gave a urine sample. The Defendant again objected to this 
testimony, which was overruled by the trial court. (R. 133/319) The parole officer 
was asked to give the result of the test, to which the defense again objected. This 
objection was again overruled by the trial court without allowing argument. (R. 
133/320) The defense then moved that the entire testimony of the parole officer be 
stricken, which objection was again overruled. (R. 133/322) 
In closing argument the prosecutor stated: 
Beyond a shadow of a doubt is not the test that you're required to 
apply. Your test is reason. You use reason. You're the reasonable 
man that we talked about. You're the reasonable person that's been 
brought here to consider this case, and you don't need to look for 
doubt. You don't need to search for doubt. If doubt doesn't exist, 
then don't find it and find the defendant guilty. You don't have to go 
in worrying about reasonable doubt. (R. 133/336) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant raises three issues in the appeal. Defendant's first claim of 
error, which, if granted would result in reversal, was the failure of the trial court to 
grant a motion to dismiss at the end of the State's case. The evidence tying the 
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Defendant to the crime hinged entirely on the tenuous testimony of two crack cocaine 
addicts whose testimony was contradictory on several major points. The victim of the 
case could not identify the Defendant as his assailant, and therefore was of no value 
on this issue. Both crack addicts testified that the Defendant was at the scene and was 
the one who hit the victim. Both admitted to lying to the police on several occasions 
and both acknowledged lying at the preliminary hearing under oath in the case at bar. 
They both admitted to being high on crack cocaine at the time of the incident and to 
having been up on a several day drug binge immediately prior to the incident. Their 
stories conflicted on where they met the evening of the incident, how they met on the 
evening of the incident, and what occurred at the scene as well as during the getaway. 
Ms. Jackman, (a co-defendant who had entered a plea bargain on the case in 
exchange for her testimony against the Defendant) additionally had numerous 
internal inconsistencies in her testimony. Mr. Ringwood, (the other co-defendant 
who also had entered a plea bargain in exchange for his testimony against the 
Defendant) testified that Ms. Jackman was a known liar and that she lies about 
"everything basically". Mr. Ringwood also admitted that he himself lied to the 
police and to the court at a preliminary hearing "to make it go in my favor." 
The second error committed by the trial court was allowing into evidence 
testimony of a parole officer regarding the test results of a urine sample taken from 
the Defendant on the day of the crime. This testimony is problematic in two respects. 
First, this testimony constitutes expert testimony, given without prior notice and 
given without any foundation as to the training or expertise of the witness. Second, 
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the testimony is improper character evidence of a non-testifying Defendant. The 
results of this testimony were prejudicial and extremely harmful. 
The final issue on appeal is the improper definition of reasonable doubt given 
by the prosecutor in closing argument. In his closing he stated, "You're the 
reasonable person that's been brought here to consider this case and you don't need 
to look for doubt. You don't need to search for doubt. If doubt doesn't exist, then 
don't find it and find the Defendant guilty. You don't have to go in worrying about 
reasonable doubt." (R. 133/336) This statement is not only an incorrect statement of 
law, but the fact that both defense counsel and the trial court allowed it to be spoken 
to the jury gave the impression that they did not need to "worry[] about reasonable 
doubt." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO 
ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF AQUITTAL AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE FOR REASONS 
THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
A CONVICTION. 
In the case of State v. Silva 13 P.3d 604 (Utah App. Ct. 2000) the court stated, 
"[T]his court's power to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient 
evidence is limited." (Citations omitted) The Utah Supreme Court has said, "So 
long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings 
of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
State v. Mead 21 P.3d 1115, 1132 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted). Additionally, in 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated, "Ordinarily, a 
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reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must 
resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict." 
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient 
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court may 
overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Court reversed a 
conviction of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally 
valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, expert or 
otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for purposes of 
sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the defendant's guilty 
verdict. 
Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) the Court 
reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second degree murder case where the 
evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case there was undisputed evidence that 
the victim had been murdered. The sole evidence against the defendant consisted of 
the fact that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim, and the fact that 
he had related a dream to three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and 
that he "thought he hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." (Id at 446) In that 
case the Court stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as 
it will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a speculative 
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leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, 
stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 2002) 
the Court, again recognizing the significant standard of review required to reverse a 
conviction in an insufficient evidence appeal, reversed the trial court's conviction of 
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined that a 
second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. No other 
evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was found, but 
rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had the motive and 
opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that conviction, the Court 
held: 
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the 
defendant's] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the evidence 
supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the opportunity 
to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it ever existed. 
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an extensive 
marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. The seminal problem 
in the case is that the only testimony that ties the Defendant to the crime was the 
testimony of two crack-cocaine addicts that had been high on cocaine for several 
days prior to the crime. The testimony is undisputed that the victim of the crime 
could not identify the Defendant as one of the assailants. The testimony is also 
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undisputed that the Defendant never admitted to anyone that he was in any way 
involved in the crime. Furthermore, he had an alibi witness with significant 
credibility, since she was a former girlfriend with whom he had had an admittedly 
acrimonious separation. 
In examining the testimony of the two crack cocaine addicts, it must be 
acknowledged that they both testified that the Defendant was at the scene of the 
crime and that he was the person who actually struck the victim. They both stated 
that the Defendant was picked up at a house on Child's street and that he rode in a car 
owned by a person named Brenda. Their story is also consistent with regards to the 
occurrences inside the motel room. They both said that the two males waited outside 
while Ms. Jackman knocked on the door and gained entry under the assumption that 
she was alone. They both said that the two males then entered the room, and while 
she was rummaging through the victims clothes the Defendant hit the victim and 
knocked him to the floor. Ms. Jackman did not see the actual assault but turned 
around after the victim had hit the floor. At this point her testimony diverges from 
that of Mr. Ringwood. He claimed that the Defendant hit the victim several times (a 
fact disputed by the victim himself) and that the Defendant pulled the chair out from 
under the victim. Both Ms. Jackman and the victim would dispute this claim. The 
victim said that he was hit once and fell to the floor striking his head on the heat 
register. Ms. Jackman's story was that she turned when she heard the hit and saw the 
victim on the floor. She did not say the chair was moved in any way. 
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The trial testimony of Mr. Ringwood was consistent with that of Ms. Jackman 
claiming that Mr. Ringwood took the victim's wallet. However, it must be noted that 
his testimony is in direct contradiction with his prior testimony at the preliminary 
hearing where he said the Defendant took the wallet from the victim. 
The remainder of the two crack-addict's testimonies is widely divergent 
concerning the occurrences before the incident and after the incident. They are also in 
direct contrast to the Defendant's witness Danielle Peterson and to the testimony of 
the victim himself. 
Ms. Jackman testified that she had gone to the victim's apartment the night 
before at around 7:00 p.m. and that they had eaten pizza together. (R. 133/179) 
Around 3:00 a.m. she returned to his room and they talked about her performing a 
sexual act for money. The victim then gave her $20, and she left promising to return 
and perform the act later. R. 133 /181) This was in direct contradiction of the 
victim's testimony who stated that she had come to his room around 5:30 a.m. and 
asked to use the phone. While there she inquired if he would like to hire her for a 
sexual act, which the victim declined. He then gave her $20 for bus fare and she left. 
Ms. Jackman testified that before leaving the room she made a call to Mr. 
Ringwood. At this point even her own testimony became internally confusing 
because she claimed that Mr. Ringwood had given her a ride to the motel room and 
was waiting outside, and yet she claimed she went into the room to call Mr. 
Ringwood. When queried on this problem she simply went on to other testimony 
with no explanation. Mr. Ringwood contradicted this testimony saying she had 
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arrived at the home on Childs immediately before they discussed and then went to the 
motel room to commit the crime. He never claimed to have gone to the motel room 
earlier in the morning. 
The events that occurred immediately after the crime were also differently 
described. Ms. Jackman claimed that the three left the motel room, with the 
Defendant having blood on his shoes. Mr. Ringwood stated that he never saw blood 
on the Defendant. He claimed that as they drove back to the house on Childs street 
that he divided up the money with each getting approximately $120-$ 140. Ms. 
Jackman said that they drove to a Maverick store and there divided up the money 
equally with each getting about $60. The victim claimed that $200 was stolen, which 
would be closer to the amount claimed by Ms. Jackman. Mr. Ringwood denied on 
several occasions ever going to a Maverick store, saying that the Maverick was past 
the Childs residence. 
Finally, both of the State's witnesses contradict the testimony of Danielle 
Peterson who testified, despite having been separated from the Defendant, that he had 
been at her home the evening and morning in question. 
The Defendant recognizes that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in 
a jury verdict, the standard of review is narrow. See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 
345 (Utah 1985). 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. We 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
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doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. State 
v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1987). As long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, "from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime 
can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." (State v. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345.) 
In the present case the reasonable inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant committed the crime". Given the fact that the witnesses5 statements on 
core fact are so contradictory, the reliability of the jury's verdict in this case must be 
called into question. This is even more true where the jury was improperly influenced 
by improper evidence regarding a urine sample taken from the Defendant. These 
problems shake the very foundation of the jury verdict in the case at bar. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN RULING TO ADMIT EXPERT TESTIMONY OF 
OFFICER TOLMAN REGARDING A FLASH TEST OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S URINE. 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that before any expert witness 
in a criminal trial can testify the offering party must give at least 3 0-days notice to 
the opposing party. Furthermore, any expertise of a witness must be adequately 
established by proper foundational evidence. In the case at bar, neither requirement 
was met. 
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UCA §77-17-13 provides in relevant part: 
(1) (a) if the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a 
felony case at trial or any hearing ... the party intending to call the expert 
shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less 
than 30 days before trial. 
The notice intended in this section includes information concerning the 
expert's name, address, curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report if one 
exists. The purpose for this section is to allow opposing counsel to be notified of the 
expert witness, and to give opposing counsel an opportunity to contact that witness 
and determine exactly what the witness intends to testify about, and an opportunity 
for opposing counsel to prepare for the examination and possibly retain a witness in 
rebuttal 
UCA §77-17-13(4)(a) provides the Defendant a remedy in the event of a 
violation of this requirement by the prosecution. That subsection provides: 
If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with 
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary 
to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial 
or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
The Utah appellate courts have routinely held that compliance with UCA §77-
17-13 is mandatory. In the case of State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 
1997) the court established a four-prong test to be used in reviewing a trial court's 
denial of a motion for continuance due to a §77-17-13 violation. That test is set forth 
as follows: 
In reviewing the denial of appellant's request for continuance or other 
relief, we consider four factors: (1) the extent of appellant's diligence 
in his efforts to ready his defense prior to the date set for trial; (2) the 
likelihood that the need for a continuance could have been met if the 
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continuance had been granted; (3) the extent to which granting the 
continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the opposing 
party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant might have suffered 
harm as a result of the court's denial. (Citations omitted) 
In that case, the Court was presented with a factual situation in which the 
prosecution, during the first day of trial delivered some clothing to the State crime 
lab for analysis. On the afternoon of the first day of trial, the prosecution presented 
to the defense counsel with a report that the analysis resulted in a finding of human 
blood on the clothing. The Defendant then moved for the exclusion of the evidence, 
or for a continuance of the trial. The trial court denied both motions. During the in 
limine motion hearing, the prosecutor tried to argue that the proposed expert 
testimony was not prejudicial. The Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, making 
the following observation of the trial court exchange in that hearing: 
The prosecutor stated: "[W]hether or not there is blood on the panties is 
not a pivotal issue in this case, your honor." In response, the trial judge 
correctly observed, with our emphasis, as follows: 
Well, let me just tell you, as a prefatory matter / consider that 
testimony critical It's one thing to have lay people say it looks like 
blood. It's quite another thing to have the laboratory say it is in fact 
blood. For a couple of reasons. One, it's objective. And number two, its 
impact upon jurors is substantially different than having the mother of 
the child say it looked like blood. (Id. at 531) 
Based upon an analysis under the four-prong test, this Court reversed the 
Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. 
In the case of State v. Tolano, 19 P.3d 400 (Utah App. 2001), which is 
remarkably similar to the case at bar, the Court was presented with a case wherein the 
prosecution called two criminologists to testify that the substance presented into 
evidence was in fact cocaine. The prosecution had failed to provide the requisite 
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notice to defense, and the Defendant objected to the testimony, moved that the 
testimony be stricken, and requested a continuance. The trial court denied the 
continuance and this Court held: 
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
[defendant's] motion for continuance. First, [the defendant] exercised 
appropriate diligence in his efforts to ready his defense prior to the date 
set for trial... Second, it is likely that [the defendant] could have been 
more adequately prepared to meet the expert testimony at trial if the 
court had granted the continuance... Third, [the defendant's] right to 
the fair trial outweighed any inconvenience to the court, the opposing 
party, and the jury that may have been caused by a continuance... (Id. 
at 403) 
Furthermore, the Court noted that according to the case of State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 
1167 (Utah App. 1998), the burden of establishing prejudice, is shifted to the State. 
The court, quoting the Arellano decision, held, "therefore to establish the 
prosecution's error was not prejudicial, the State must persuade the court that there is 
no reasonable likelihood that absent the prosecutor's error, the outcome would have 
been more favorable for the defendant". (Id at 404) 
In the case of State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167 (Utah App. 1998), the Utah 
Court of Appeals reiterated the four-prong criteria set forth above in reviewing expert 
witness testimony. In that case, the court was presented with a situation wherein the 
State utilized the testimony of the State Crime Lab chemist to testify regarding the 
identity of a controlled substance (cocaine). The State had utilized this expert during 
the preliminary hearing, and then five days prior to trial notified the Defendant that it 
intended to use that expert at trial. The trial court denied the Defendant's motion to 
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exclude the testimony3, as well as the defense motion for continuance. The court 
concluded that there was uncontroverted testimony that the Defendant had not been 
given the proper 30-day notice of the proposed expert testimony, and therefore he 
was entitled to a continuance. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
denial of the Defendant's motion for continuance, and remanded the case for new 
trial. 
In State v. Tolano infra, the Court conducted a detailed analysis of the four-
prong test set forth above. That analysis may be useful in examining the present case, 
and is therefore reviewed here. Under the first prong, the Court found that 
First, Tolano exercised appropriate diligence in his efforts to ready his 
defense prior to the date set for trial. For example, Tolano interviewed 
witnesses and made arrangements to have witnesses, including his 
stepson from Mexico, testify on his behalf. In addition, Tolano 
extensively cross-examined most of the State's witnesses, Tolano made 
a chart outlining the area where the alleged offense occurred, and 
Tolano arranged for an interpreter when necessary. Finally, although 
Tolano was aware that the criminologists prepared the toxicology 
report, "it is not defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all 
potential, yet undisclosed expert witnesses. . . . " Consequently, 
"defense counsel appears to have been fully prepared to present 
defendant's case." (Id at 403 citations omitted) 
Under the second prong, the court found: 
Second, it is likely that Tolano could have been more adequately 
prepared to meet the expert testimony if the trial court had granted the 
continuance. Specifically, a continuance would have provided Tolano 
with an opportunity to examine the testing procedures used by the 
experts and compare them with other testing methods, hire his own 
expert to challenge the testing procedures, and examine the resumes of 
the experts and possibly impugn their qualifications. Therefore, "[a] 
3
 State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah App. 1998), "Here, the trial court did not find that the State 
acted in bad faith. Therefore, as to defendant's argument that McNair's (State Crime Lab chemist) expert 
testimony should have been excluded, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to exclude McNair's testimony." 
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continuance would have both provided defendant more time to prepare 
to challenge [the experts'] testimony . . . and then incorporate any new 
information into the defense strategy." (Id at 403 citations omitted) 
The third test, determining whether the inconvenience to the court, opposing 
party and the jury is outweighed by the Defendants right to a fair trial, the Court 
noted that "this court has specifically held that such an administrative concern is 
outweighed by the appellant's right to a fair trial" (Id. at 404 citations omitted) 
The fourth factor, the harm the Defendant suffered as a result of the court's 
denial for a motion to continue, is to some extent presumed by this Court. In State v. 
Tolano, infra, the court held: 
The final factor — the extent to which Tolano might have suffered 
harm as a result of the court's denial — is the "'most important among 
the factors.'" In Arellano, we recognized the difficult burden placed on 
defendants to establish prejudice in cases such as these, and we shifted 
the burden of proving prejudice from the defendant to the State. See id. 
"Therefore, to establish that the prosecution's error was not prejudicial, 
the State must persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that, absent the prosecution's error, the outcome would have been more 
favorable for defendant." (Id. at 404 citations omitted) 
In the case at bar, there is no question that all four prongs of the requisite test 
had clearly been met. Under the first test, whether or not defense counsel had 
adequately prepared for trial, all indication from reading the transcript of the trial 
would indicate that is in fact the case. Defense counsel immediately objected to the 
proposed evidence. Defense counsel did extensive cross-examination of various 
witnesses. There is no indication the defense counsel was unprepared for trial. It is 
important to note in the present case that the evidence was presented in the State's 
rebuttal portion of the trial, and therefore was a surprise to the Defendant. 
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Furthermore, "it is not defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all potential, yet 
undisclosed expert witnesses'^ State v. Tolano at 403) 
Considering the second prong, "It is likely that [the defendant] could been 
more adequately prepared to meet the expert testimony of the trial court had granted 
the continuance." Furthermore, a continuance would have allowed defense counsel 
"an opportunity to examine the testing procedures used by the experts and compare 
them with other testing methods, hire his own expert to challenge the testing 
procedures, and examine the resumes of the experts and possibly impugn their 
qualifications." (Id at 403 citations omitted) 
The third issue, with regards to inconvenience to the trial court, opposing 
counsel, or the jury, there is no question that the Defendant's right to a fair trial 
clearly outweighs administrative concerns. Furthermore, since it is the State that 
failed to provide notice as required under §77-17-13, it would be disingenuous for the 
state to thereafter argue that it has been inconvenience by the Defendant's timely 
objection. 
The final prong, harm to the Defendant, has clearly been established. Just as 
in all of the cases cited above, the expert testimony regarding the presence of three 
drugs in the Defendant's system was clearly prejudicial to the Defendant. 
The State may argue that the testimony of the parole officer simply constitutes 
lay testimony belies the fact that the witness testified about a scientific procedure in 
establishing that the Defendant's urine contained three controlled substances. In State 
v. Begishe infra, the trial court recognized this fact in stating, 
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Well, let me just tell you, as a prefatory matter / consider that testimony 
critical. It's one thing to have lay people say it looks like blood. It's 
quite another thing to have the laboratory say it is in fact blood. For a 
couple of reasons. One, it's objective. And number two, its impact upon 
jurors is substantially different than having the mother of the child say 
it looked like blood. (Id. at 531) 
The fourth, and final prong of the §77-17-13 test is the burden of establishing 
the lack of harm to the Defendant. As mentioned above, this has been placed on the 
prosecution, and it is the Defendant's position that the prosecution cannot meet that 
burden. There is no question that if the jury had not heard the evidence regarding the 
controlled substances in the Defendant's system, the overall weakness of the States 
case would have collapsed. The State's reliance on the fact that the Defendant was as 
doped up as their other witnesses establishes that the Defendant was clearly 
prejudiced by the §77-17-13 violation. 
POINT III 
THE PROSECUTOR COMMITED MISCONDUCT BY 
TELLING THE JURY THAT THEY NEED NOT WORRY 
ABOUT REASONABLE DOUBT. 
During the prosecutor's closing statement he proclaimed that the law 
regarding reasonable doubt was as follows: 
Beyond a shadow of a doubt is not the test that you're required to 
apply. Your test is reason. You use reason. You're the reasonable 
man that we talked about. You're the reasonable person that's been 
brought here to consider this case and you don't need to look for 
doubt. You don't need to search for doubt. If doubt doesn't exist, 
then don't find it and find the defendant guilty. You don't have to 
go in worrying about reasonable doubt. (R. 133/336 emphasis added) 
This statement, which was obviously improper, went to the jury without any 
objection by defense counsel and without any comment or curative instruction by the 
27 
trial court. These statements amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because "the 
remarks call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their verdict. . ." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1261 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, these comments were extremely prejudicial. 
The 5th and 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as 
Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah guarantees that all criminal 
defendants shall be guaranteed due process of law, which is the embodiment of a fair 
trial. The Supreme Court in the case of Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) 
held: 
"It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process Clause 
embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply 
imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed 
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history. 
Due Process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is 
fair and right and just."4 
Further, the Court has observed that "[d]ue process is violated if a practice or 
rule 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of 
our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 
105 (1934). 
One of the basics of this principle of justice is that the prosecutor in a criminal 
case is held to a higher standard than a mere advocate. The prosecutor has taken an 
oath to uphold justice and to shun any actions that could jeopardize fairness. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 
88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) held: 
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"[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may 
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has likewise observed the special position a 
prosecutor holds when it stated: 
"Once again we observe that prosecutors have duties that rise above 
those of privately employed attorneys. As former Chief Justice Gordon 
Hall, himself a prosecutor prior to assuming the bench, observed in 
Emmett, (supra) '[P]rosecutors have a duty to eschew all improper 
tactics.5" State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 961(Utah 1999) 
Prosecutorial misconduct can occur in various manners and can take a variety 
of forms. The Court, in the case of State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, held, "We will 
reverse a jury verdict because of prosecutorial misconduct if we find the prosecutor's 
remarks were improper and harmful to defendant." In a long line of cases the 
Appellate Courts of the State of Utah have closely examined prosecutors' actions in 
criminal trials, and reversed those convictions, which were tainted by prosecutorial 
misconduct. A review of some of those cases follows. 
In State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951 (Utah 1999) the court reversed a conviction 
of sexual abuse of a child where there were several errors including prosecutorial 
misconduct. The Court was particularity careful in examining prosecutorial 
4
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misconduct in cases where proof of guilt is not strong. "Once again we observe that 
prosecutors have duties that rise above those of privately employed attorneys." {Id. 
961) 
In the case of State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993) the Court examined 
questions and statements of the prosecutor and found obvious error. The Court noted, 
"The insinuation that other evidence exists encourages the jury to determine its 
verdict based upon evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a Defendant's right to 
a trial based upon the evidence presented. The prosecutor's remarks and his questions 
asked of Detective Couch constituted obvious error." {Id at 349) Although the Court 
found prosecutorial misconduct to be error, they deemed the error harmless due to the 
overwhelming admissible evidence produced elsewhere in the trial. "When there is 
strong proof of guilt, the conduct or remark of a prosecutor is not presumed 
prejudicial. Therefore, unless the error undermines our confidence in the jury verdict, 
we will not overturn that verdict." {Id at 349) 
In State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) the court found plain error in a 
prosecutions comments in closing argument. In commenting on Emmett's forgery 
conviction, the prosecutor noted that the victim of the crime was Emmett's sister. 
Stating that Emmett is "[s]omeone who took advantage of his own family member," 
the prosecutor declared, "Well, he did it again." {Id at 786) In that case the court 
found that the evidence of guilt in the remainder of the trial was not strong, and 
therefore reversed the conviction of sodomy of a child. 
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The Supreme Court likewise found prosecutorial misconduct in the case of 
State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986). In that case the prosecutor asked 
Defendant in cross examination about additional felonies (the Defendant had 
admitted to three felony convictions on direct examination) inferring he had others. 
The Defendant denied other convictions and the prosecutor never offered any 
evidence of other convictions. The court however affirmed the conviction ruling that 
"[I]n view of the evidence adduced and the instructions given, and the fact that 
Defendant did admit to three prior convictions for burglary, we cannot say that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been any different 
in the absence of the prosecutor's misconduct." (Id at 770) 
In one of the most cited cases regarding prosecutorial misconduct, the Court 
reversed the conviction of the defendant in the case of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1984). In that case, the court found prosecutorial misconduct where the 
prosecutor referred to the defendant's legal name change as an alias, where the 
prosecutor claimed the defendant was under a federal witness identity program, and 
also inferred that the defendant was involved in various criminal matters. In closing 
statement, the prosecutor compared the defendant to Hinkley and asked the jury 
"[U]se your experience, and in talking to one another, don't put your common sense 
aside. If you have been involved in a situation, speak up, talk about it, deliberate it." 
(Id. at 486) The court found prosecutorial misconduct in holding : 
In this case, there was not compelling proof of defendant's guilt. 
The jury could have found either way. Consequently, we are compelled 
to find that the second step of the Valdez test has been met. The jurors 
"probably were influenced by" the remarks of the prosecutor. While the 
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trial court properly attempted to correct the errors, the potential for 
harm, the probability for harm, and the continued efforts of the 
prosecutor were too flagrant to be corrected. (Id. at 487) 
In the case of State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court found that the prosecutors reference to the defendant's receiving income while 
on social security as "double dipping" and "a cancer on society", signing paychecks 
as "forging of signatures" and "filing for bankruptcy as an indication of dishonesty" 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The court held, "[u]nder the circumstances of 
this case, there is no doubt that the prosecutor's 'remarks called to the jurors' 
attention matters which they would not be justified in considering . . . [and that they] 
were probably influenced by the remarks.'" (Id. at 51) The Court found that the 
prosecutor's conduct was improper, and would have constituted grounds for a new 
trial if they had not reversed the convictions for insufficiency of the evidence. 
In State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981) the Court reversed the 
conviction of aggravated robbery on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. In that 
case the defense objected several times to references to the defendant's post Miranda 
silence, both during examination of witnesses as well as closing. The Court held; 
"Even if it could be validly argued that defendant's objection and the 
court's attempt to cure the matter by striking and admonition were 
effective, this cannot be said about prosecutor's comments during his 
final argument. The continued attempts by the prosecutor to put the 
defendant's silence before the jury after his having been advised of his 
right to remain silent amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. The 
references to defendant's silence are fundamental error, which could 
have affected the result and are therefore prejudicial." (Id. at 147) 
In the case of Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981), the Court was 
presented with a case in which the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence from 
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the defense and during trial questioned witnesses and commented in closing about 
things he knew were incorrect. The court found prosecutorial misconduct and 
reversed the conviction. There was no objection since this evidence was discovered 
by the defense after trial. 
Finally, in the case of State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (1973), the Utah Supreme 
Court established a test for determining prosecutorial misconduct. "The test of 
whether the remarks made by counsel are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a 
criminal case is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they 
would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and were they, 
under the circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by those 
remarks." Id. at 426. 
In the case at bar, the first part of the test is met. "[D]id the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict. . ." Id. 
The Defendant does not need to show bad faith on the part of the prosecutor 
to show prosecutorial misconduct. "In Troy, we did not suggest that bad faith need 
be shown. All that is necessary, according to Troy, is that cthe remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict and that the remarks rise to the level of prejudicial error." 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1261 (Utah 1988)(quoting State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 
483, 486 (Utah 1984)). 
33 
In the present case there is no question that the prosecutor called to the 
"attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict." The prosecutor made a statement that is in clear 
contradiction to constitutional provisions, statutory law and extensive case law. The 
very bedrock of criminal prosecutions is the principle that a criminal defendant is 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is, (and 
was in this case) defined in a jury instruction in every criminal case. The 
prosecutor's statement in the case at bar was simply incorrect. 
When deciding whether the second part of the test is met an appellate court 
should consider all of the evidence concerning a defendant's guilt. See, State v. Troy, 
688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) ("Step two is more difficult and involves a 
consideration of the circumstances of the case as a whole. In making such a 
consideration, it is appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt."). 
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged 
conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial. Likewise, in a 
case with less compelling proof, this court will more closely 
scrutinize the conduct." Id. (citations omitted). 
In the present case the evidence that the Defendant committed this offense is 
weak. As set forth in Point I above, the only evidence that tied the Defendant to the 
crime was the highly contradictory testimony of two crack cocaine addicts, both of 
whom were admitted liars. There is no physical evidence that puts the Defendant at 
the scene. There is no confession or other eyewitness testimony that identifies the 
Defendant as the perpetrator. 
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Although the Defendant's attorney didn't object to the evidence it was clearly 
plain error for this evidence to be admitted. "To establish plain error, a defendant 
must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See 
also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) In the case of State v. 
Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994) this Court held, "Under [the plain 
error] standard, we will not reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and 
that the error was both obvious and harmful". The Court further ruled, "An error is 
harmful if the likelihood of a different result is 'sufficiently high to undermine 
confidence in the verdict.'" (Id at 1010) 
The first prong of the plain error test is showing that an error occurred. In this 
case, that prong is relatively obvious. In closing statement the prosecutor made 
statement to the jury that they need not worry about reasonable doubt. This 
proclamation is in contradiction to established case law, as well as statutory and 
constitutional requirements. This Court has defined and redefined the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt on numerous occasions. In the recent case of 
State v. Cruz, WL1705752 f 11-20, (Utah 2005) the Court reviewed and upheld 
several jury instructions concerning reasonable doubt, all of which instructed the jury 
to carefully examine doubt and then to determine if that doubt was reasonable. 
In the case of State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305, p 7 (Utah 2005) the Utah Supreme 
Court gave specific instructions regarding the language preferred injury instructions 
concerning reasonable doubt. In that case the Court held: 
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The [State] has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil 
cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact 
is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the [State's] proof 
must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly 
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this 
world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the 
law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, 
based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced 
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him 
guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he 
is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him 
not guilty. (Id. at f37„ emphasis added) 
In the case at bar, the trial court itself gave an instruction that was at variance 
to the prosecutors claim. The problem with the occurrences in the case at bar is that 
neither defense counsel nor the trial court corrected the prosecutor, thus giving the 
impression to the non-law trained jury that they "don't have to go [into the jury 
deliberations] worrying about reasonable doubt." This is exactly opposite of what 
they should be doing in their deliberations. The jury must consider, worry about and 
ultimately dismiss any doubt that they don't find to be reasonable before they can 
convict a criminal defendant. The jury in this case did none of the above. 
The second prong of the plain error standard is that the error was both obvious 
and harmful. The obviousness issue was addressed above and cannot be any clearer. 
The prosecutor clearly made an incorrect statement of law. 
The fact that the error was harmful is to some extent established by the finding 
of guilt of the Defendant on both counts charged in a case where the evidence of guilt 
was not strong. In the present case, the jury was presented with testimony of two 
witnesses who were high on crack cocaine and both admitted liars. They both 
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acknowledged that their own criminal cases were plea bargained based on their 
testimony against the Defendant. The Defendant was convicted solely on the 
contradictory stories of these two witnesses. The reasonable doubt is fully addressed 
in Point I above, and will not be repeated here at risk of needless repetition. 
POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 
SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY 
HIS ATTORNEY'S BLATANT FAILURES DURING AND 
BEFORE TRIAL. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court 
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was ineffective. 
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave some 
guidance in noting; "The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at 688) Although the Court 
in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a 
checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", (Id. at 688) it did mention 
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certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest" as well as a duty "to consult with the defendant on 
important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments 
in the course of the prosecution." (Id. at 688) Additionally, the overreaching 
requirement by the Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is that 
the "performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances." (Id. at 688) 
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsel's 
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above. 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, Ml U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 
L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) the Court was presented with a case where defense counsel, due 
to a failure to conduct proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress 
evidence under the 4th amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction 
under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed that 
reversal. In that affirmation of reversal the Court stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim 
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant 
must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and 
that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 
different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual 
prejudice. {Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 
L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)) 
In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to comport with 
constitutional requirements the Court held: 
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In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial 
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible 
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally creditable 
enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent and pervasive 
failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." [citation 
omitted] Under these circumstances, although the failure of the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall 
performance was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the 
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's 
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional assistance 
in the respects alleged. (Kimmelman v. Morrrison, Ml U.S. 365, 386 
(1986)) 
In the case of Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 
471, (U.S. 2003) the U.S. Supreme Court found that counsel's failure to investigate 
the extensive abuse the defendant had suffered through his life was unreasonable. 
The Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that this failure resulted in defense 
counsels inability to present this evidence to the sentencing jury in a capital case. The 
Court stated: 
We further find that had the jury been confronted with this considerable 
mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have 
returned with a different sentence. (Wiggins v. Smith at Point III) 
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have likewise 
rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can guide a 
determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties. 
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) the Court 
held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a 4th Amendment violation 
constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. In that case, the Court 
applied the Strickland test to a situation where defense counsel had in a pretrial 
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motion moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The trial court 
denied that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing. During trial the 
officer altered his testimony establishing the lack of plain view, yet trial counsel did 
not re-raise the motion to suppress. The Court held that "where a defendant can show 
that there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, 
the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860 
P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
In the case of State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), the Utah 
Court of Appeals reversed a defendant's conviction under an ineffective assistance of 
counsel theory where counsel "fail[ed] to move for a directed verdict after the State 
failed to present evidence that Smith did not possess a valid concealed weapon 
permit during its case in chief." 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in the case of State v. Smith, 65 P.3d 648, 655 
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) reversed the conviction of a defendant on ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims where there was "no possible explanation or tactical reason" for 
counsels failure to move to dismiss at the close of the state's case. In that case, the 
Court held: 
We conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise this lack of evidence as a basis 
for dismissal of the charge is "so deficient as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness." (citations omitted) 
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court 
expanded the Strickland test in certain circumstances. The Court stated: 
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It is true that while the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for 
resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, there 
are situations in which the overriding focus on fundamental fairness 
may affect the analysis. 
In Williams v. Taylor, the Court reversed the defendant's death sentence on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the defense counsel did not investigate 
the defendant's "nightmarish childhood", nor the fact that the defendant was 
"borderline mentally retarded" (Id. at 395, 396) The Court concluded that defense 
counsel unreasonably failed to begin mitigation investigation until one week prior to 
trial, and then unreasonably failed to investigate numerous areas of mitigating 
evidence that could have benefited the defendant in the penalty phase. 
In the case of State v. Bennett 999 P.2d 1, 3, (Utah 2000) Justice Durham, in a 
concurring opinion noted: 
\ 13 This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which has 
been recognized in many cases. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 
439, 442 (Utah 1996) (noting, in ineffective assistance of counsel case, 
that "pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, we 
may presume prejudice in circumstances where it is unnecessary and 
ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual prejudice" 
In the present case, the Defendant claims that counsel was ineffective in one 
instance during the trial. Specifically, during closing arguments the prosecutor made 
several incorrect and highly significant statements regarding reasonable doubt that 
are in direct contravention to statutory, constitutional, and case law. For some reason 
defense counsel failed to object to the statements, which in effect implied his 
acquiescence to the prosecutor's claim that the jury need not worry about reasonable 
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doubt and deliberations. A more thorough discussion of this issue was presented in 
Point III above. 
1 ticulatcu in Strickland is "the 
Defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the IJdeiicJiifil ol 
a fair - a. ! *v>ishinvton, 466 U.S. at 687, 
80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the ...A... .nendment 
guaraniL assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 
(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second pai 
Strickland test a defenda ' ' I il Minn • i mihli j nbahilitv that, but 
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different ,1' reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to I mdermine 
confidence in the outcoi » ,| ' ' ' <"' ' * 1 8 ) ( q i loting Strickh u ;< I v I \ \ i shu ig tc >/ i, 466 I J.S. 
668, 694 (1984V* i n m a r ii^ determination that counsel was ineffective the 
appellate court should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such 
factors as whetnt u plated 
effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record.5 / / 
In the present case, there is no question that the verdict was not strongly 
supported by evidence II Luilm (In | , I I I II I III i y i J I u \ .ibout 
• highly probative to the second prong of the Strickland test. With 
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a jury given information that may need not worry about reasonable doubt establishes 
a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. 
When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the 
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence in the 
outcome of the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this court 
reverse the Defendant's conviction and, if reversed for grounds of insufficient 
evidence, remand for dismissal, if reversed for grounds of Rule 403 and 404 
violations or inadequate assistance of counsel, remand for a new trial. 
DATED this / Jday of November 2005. 
JDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDENi COU^f'[" ' 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HAY 2 4 2005 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOSEPH HOSKINS, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041906257 FS 
Judge: JOHN R MORRIS 
Date: May 23, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: carier 
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RYAN BUSHELL, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 23, 1981 
Video 
Tape Number: M052305 Tape Count: 1017 
CHARGES 
1. ROBBERY (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/09/2005 Guilty 
2. SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/09/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for APP Sentencing. The defendant is present in 
custody from the Utah State Prison with counsel. A presentence 
investigation report has been submitted to the Court. 
The defendant objects to the prison recommendation. Court proceeds 
with sentencing. 
Page 1 
r o o 
Case No: 041906257 
Date: May 23, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ROBBERY a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff _:ie defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Each term is to run consecutive with one another and consecutive 
any other sentence being served. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SIMPLE ASSAULT a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The term of 365 days hall h^ served at the Utah State Prison. 
Date >• I 1 J : , i , ; d a } < y y x > M ^ , 2 0 *^ r. 
, yUg-v^ 
JT^ KN R MORRIS 
District Court Judge 
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336 2 7 t h S t r e e t . 
Q 2 7 t h a i 1 K i e s s e 1 , • i I I: 1 f: i :i • ? 
A Y e s . 
Q And who was he living with? 
A Danielle Peterson. 
Q And did you have occasion to see him sometime after 
that ? 
A I did. 
Q Wl: lei l \ 
n A u g u s t 10 t h a n d a g a i n on A u g u s t 1 7 t h . 
• w i I In I on A u g u s t 1 0 t h ? 
" my office. 
And what was the purpose of that visit? 
For hi m, to check . .s :or the month. 
'-'•> whei I he checked "in, wh -: w.is the requirement 
that you piacea JI: .e crieckec _:.. 
e's required to — 
know if this is going to the credibility of the witness 
] :ather than character evidence. 
MR. DECARIA: Yeah, IM 1 skip this, I think counsel 
may be right and rather than worry about it, I'll just move 
onto the date of the ] ; ' :i 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Decaria. 
I '!! I C E 3ARI7 • "I ; < i i. 
3 ] 9 
1 Q (BY MR. DECARIA) On August 17, 2004, you made 
2 contact with the defendant again; is that correct? 
3 A That is correct. 
4 Q And where were you at the time? 
5 A In my office. 
6 Q And was there an appointment for him to come in? 
7 A I don't recall exactly what precipitated the visit. 
8 Q He did come in? 
9 A He did. 
10 Q And what was the purpose of that visit? 
11 A Again, probably to check in. I'd probably asked 
12 him to come in and on that day I requested a urinalysis from 
13 him. 
14 Q Okay. So did you take urine from him? 
15 A I did. 
16 Q And did you witness the deposit of the urine? 
17 A I did. 
18 MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, I'm going to object to 
19 this. I don't think this has anything to do with impeachment 
20 of Ms. Peterson. 
21 THE COURT: Overruled. 
22 Q (BY MR. DECARIA) And so then you witnessed the 
23 defendant deposit the urine into the cup and then what did 
24 you do with it? 
25 | A Tested it. 
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MR. 
THE 
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• • • 1 i, 
BUSHELL: 
COURT: 
defendant but for 
testified in court 
the result of the 
I object again. 
Overruled. 
1 11 DECARIA) Wl lat v : L, 3 1:1: le 
Hoskins 
••
 ini1
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1 A Marijuana. 
2 MR. DECARIA: Okay. I have no further questions. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you Mr. Decaria. Mr. Bushell? 
4 MR. BUSHELL: I have no question of this witness. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bushell. 
6 Thank you very much, Mr. Tolman. You may step 
7 down. 
8 MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, I would like to make a 
9 motion at this time. 
10 THE COURT: Please do so. 
11 MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, I would move that the 
12 entire testimony of Mr. Tolman be stricken in that it in not 
13 way showed credibility towards the prior witness, Ms. 
14 Peterson, in this matter. It was only toward the character 
15 of my client. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Decaria? 
17 MR. .DECARIA: Your Honor, I'd respond by saying 
18 that her credibility as to her knowledge as to the 
19 whereabouts and the activities of the defendant are in 
20 question as soon as she testifies. When she testified, of 
21 course, that she never saw the defendant use drugs, had no 
22 knowledge of his using drugs and he was in her presence at 
23 all times, almost at all times. Then that issue becomes 
24 important and when you find out the defendant had drugs in 
25 his system the day of the actual incident, it leads to 
322 
1 Now wi lat I say is not evidence. What counsel says 
2 is not evidence. Neither he nor I were at the Ogden River 
3 Inn when this thing occurred. The defendant requested a jury 
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l) a jury trial. It cuts neither for or against his guilt or 
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7 him that right to that jury trial and it's my obligation as 
8 the prosecutor of this county to guarantee that he gets it 
9 and gets it fairly and that's what my intention has been 
10 throughout this hearing. 
11 The defendant is charged with two crimes. He's 
12 charged with robbery, robbery '.:. the same way that E] ] i s 
13 R i n g w o o \~ -inosha JacKi;.;. %> -.. jt 
14 crime, n^ worse, one that carries no more punishment, one 
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16 charged, however, with the charge of assault because as 
17 you've heard the testimony, he's the one that struck this 
18 little man. 
19 I want to talk about some of the things that you're 
2 0 suppose to i ise a ,.s a g uide for yoi ir deliberations toda;\, 0ne 
21 is, reasonable doubt. The judge has instructed you on 
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23 30. Sometimes you hear - it's used in the legal context 
24 sometimes and it bothers me when this :i s done, Peop] e say I 
25 ( know it's true beyond a shadow of a doubt or there's even a 
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